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A Right Without a Remedy Is No Right at
All: a Case for Why AB 1844 Requires a
Remedial Scheme and What It Might Be
Tina Lu*
This note seeks to explore whether California intended to create a
right or right of action for a plaintiff seeking to sue an employer for
an AB 1844 violation, and if so, what remedies are available to the
plaintiff This note discusses severalremedies that may be available:
options include, but are not limited to, a discussion of the remedial
scheme created by the Private Attorney General Act of 2004; a
wrongful discharge claim in violation of public policy; or a civil
penalty. Next, this note discusses whether or not the trifocal
approach of the ights -right of action-remedy equation is the best
test a courtshould use and advocates for an alternativeanalysis under
Professor Zeigler's singular approach. Lastly, this note suggests a
solution for the California courts to adopt in deciding a case arising
under AB 1844.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social media usage is on the rise'. According to Nielsen's Social
Media Report 2, users spend more time on social networks than any
other site.
Users on social media sites often post personal
information about themselves on their social media accounts
including their age, religion, or ethnic background.' For example,

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; B.A.,
Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 2008. The author thanks professor Michael
Zamperini for his guidance, as well as the editors of the Hastings Business Law Journal
1. Social media refers to the means of interactions among people in which they create,
share, and exchange information and ideas in virtual communities and networks. Tony
Ahlqvist, et al, Social Media Roadmaps, Exploring the Futures Tnggered by Social Media, VTr
TIEDOTrEITA RESEARCH NOTES 2454,13 (2008), available at http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/tiedotteet
/2008/T2454.pdf.
2. NIELSEN, Stale of the Media: The Social Media Report, 1(2012), available at http://
www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Me
dia-Report-2012.pdf.
3. Mike Sachoff, Social Network Users Posting Too Much Personal Information,
WEBPRONEWS (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.webpronews.com/social-network-usersHASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
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Consumer Reports found that forty-two percent of users on social
media post their date of births in their profile.' When employers
request an employee or applicant to divulge their social media
passwords, this could allow the employer to access the personal
information, and use it illegally in their decision to hire the applicant.
California's new law, AB 1844,' prohibits an employer asking for such
passwords in order to prevent potential illegal actions. This note
seeks to explore whether California intended to create a right or right
of action for a plaintiff seeking to sue an employer for an AB 1844
violation, and if so, what remedies are available to the plaintiff. This
note discusses several remedies that may be available: options
include, but are not limited to, a discussion of the remedial scheme
created by the Private Attorney General Act of 2004; a wrongful
discharge claim in violation of public policy; or a civil penalty. Next,
this note discusses whether or not the trifocal approach of the
rights-right of action-remedy equation is the best test a court
should use and advocates for an alternative analysis under Professor
Zeigler's singular approach.6 Lastly, this note suggests a solution for
the California courts to adopt in deciding a case arising under AB
1844.
II. BACKGROUND
Technology use for both personal and business purposes has
increased dramatically in recent years.' The use of social media for
communication through programs such as Facebook, Twitter, and
In 2010, the number of
Linkedln has become commonplace.'
worldwide registered users of Facebook reached one-half billion.9
The personal use of social media can present problematic situations
around issues of free speech, discrimination, harassment, and even
termination,o especially as employers try to minimize the risk of
hiring someone who lacks values incompatible with the company's
goals by looking at employees and applicants' social media pages."
posting-too-much-personal-information-201 0-05.
4. Id.
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2013).
6. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach,
76 WASH. L. REV. 67,69 (2001).
7. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 3 (2012).
8. Id
9. Carl A. Warns, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Peisonal
Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
10. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 3-4.
11. A Social Media Trend We Don't "Like", L.A. Times, (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/28/opinion/la-ed-facebook-passwords-legislation-20120328.
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In just a few short years, employers have gone well beyond just using
the popular search engine, Google, to search for information on job
applicants to learn more about their prospective employees than what
is revealed in resumes or job interviews.12 Although existing law
protects employees and applicants against discrimination, and
guarantees free speech in the workplace, before the enactment of AB
1844, nothing specifically addressed the issues that arise with the use
of information obtained through social media sites.' 3 For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, and national origin. l4
For pre-employment purposes, an employer must make hiring
decisions without regard to race, religion, or gender; however, a quick
search on Facebook could give the employer this information making
the employer liable for potential hiring discrimination if that decision
was based on a protected classification. For an individual who is
already employed, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
prohibits employers from restricting the rights of employees to
engage in concerted activities, such as discussing wages, and work
conditions." This could be problematic if employers are allowed to
ask for the social media passwords, as this may deter employees from
in the social media context. One
participating in concerted activities. 16 -*
recent survey reveals that nearly eighty percent of individuals
involved in hiring and recruiting use the Internet to investigate
candidates,'
and seventy percent of hiring and recruiting
professionals in the United States have rejected a candidate based on
data found online.' 8
It is illegal in California for an employer to discriminate against
an employee or applicant on the basis of lawful conduct they engage
in during nonworking hours away from the employment site.19 As a
result, in 2012, the California legislature passed AB 1844 which
prohibits an employer from requiring or requesting an employee or

12. Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Linc Between Personal
Life and the Employment Relationshio, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
13. CAL. S. RULES COMM.,3D READING, AB 1844, at 3.

14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (2013). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2012) (regulating preemployment inquiries as to sex); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3 (2012) (regulating selection practices that
discriminate on the basis of religion); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.6 (2012) (regulating selection practices
that discriminate on the basis of national origin).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013).
16. Employees may be discouraged from engaging in concerted activities using social media
as a forum for discussing their work conditions and related issues if employers may monitor and
discover such activity and discipline the employees for such action.
17. Warns, supra note 9, at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (2013).
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applicant for employment to disclose a user name or password for the
purpose of accessing personal social media or to access personal
social media in the presence of the employer. 20 The bill also prohibits
an employer from discharging or otherwise disciplining an employee
or applicant for not complying with a request or demand by the
employer in violation of AB 1844.21 California is not alone;
lawmakers in Maryland 22 and Illinois 23 passed similar legislation to
address the issue of social media password privacy.
In considering AB 1844, the California Senate Rules
Committee 24 based an employee's right to privacy with regard to his
or her social media account password on the decision in Pietrylo v.
Hillstone Restaurant Group.25 In Pietrylo, two employees at
Houston's Restaurant, Pietrylo and Marino, were members of a chat
room called Spec-Tator in the social media site, MySpace, where
other empl ees were also members by invitation to chat and discuss
their work.2 Some managers at Houston's accessed the Spec-Tator
chat room by demanding and obtaining the MySpace password from a
third employee, St. Jean.27 Pietrylo and Marino sued after being fired
from Houston's because they had created a private MySpace page
that allowed fellow employees to vent about their workplace.2 8 The
jury ultimately found that St. Jean's consent to disclose his password
was coerced,2 and ruled in favor of Pietrylo and Marino.30 Pietrylo
involved a knowing and malicious forced disclosure of an employee's
password,' making it a violation of the Stored Communications
Act.32 Going one step further, AB 1844 prevents casual or innocuous
request for disclosure of an employee's password at the outset.

20. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 1.

21. Id.
22. S.B. 433, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); H.B. 864, 430th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to disclosure any
username, password, or other means for accessing a personal account or service through an
electronic communications device).
23. H.B. 3782, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (providing that it shall be unlawful
for any employer to ask any prospective employee to provide any username, password, or other
related account information in order to gain access to a social networking website where that
prospective employee maintains an account or profile).
24. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 5.
25. Pictrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88702, at 7 (D.
N.J. Sept. 25, 2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id.at 21.
31. Id. at 2.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
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However, even though AB 1844 states that an employer cannot
ask for a password, it leaves the employee without recourse when an
employer chooses to do so anyway. In fact, the bill specifically states
that the Labor Commissioner, who is Chief of the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement ("DLSE"), is not required to investigate or
determine any violation of this law." A right without a remedy was
said to be a "monstrous absurdity." 34 As a result, AB 1844 provides
some kind of superficial protection for employees but a remedial
scheme is missing when employees seek to enforce the statute's
provision.
III. DID THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE INTEND TO
CONFER A RIGHT, RIGHT OF ACTION AND REMEDY FOR
AB 1844?
When confronted with statutes such as AB 1844 where a
remedial scheme is lacking, courts fill the void. The U.S. Supreme
Court developed a criterion to determine whether a statutory
provision should be judicially enforceable.3 ' The Court announced
that courts must determine if there is a right, imply a right of action,
or provide a remedy.36 The Court in Cort v. Ash dealt with a federal
statute, but the guidelines may be helpful in the state context as well.
The first factor to determine if there is a right asks if the "Plaintiff is
one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted." Second,
to determine if there is an implied right of action, one should look for
any indication of legislative intent to create or deny a right of action.39
Finally, the court considers if implying such a remedy for the plaintiff
is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.40
As explained below, the Cort test has been modified to varying
degrees by the Court's subsequent decisions, but the core inquiry
remains.

33. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980.
34. Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1938); see also Donald H. Zeigler, 76 WASH. L. REV.
67, 68 (2001).
35. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
36. Zeigler, supra note 6.
37. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-70 (1975).
38. Id. at 78.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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A. IS A RIGHT CONFERRED?
The first Cort inquiry determines if the statute confers a right
upon an aggrieved individual to sue privately in court. A statute
confers a right as long as it was intended for the benefit of the class of
person of which the plaintiff was a member, and the harm suffered
was of a kind the statute generally was intended to prevent.4 In
Golden State Transit Corp v. City of L.A., 42 the Court applied a
three-part test to determine if a statute created an enforceable right.
First, does violation of a statute create obligations binding on the
government or it only expresses a congressional preference for
certain kinds of treatment. Second, does plaintiff assert an interest
that is not vague or amorphous? And third, does the provision in
question meant to benefit the plaintiff?
In Golden State Transit,plaintiff, a taxicompany, alleged that the
city interfered with the company's labor relations by conditioning the
renewal of its franchise license on the settlement of a labor dispute.
Plaintiff further alleged that this interference was compensable under
the NLRA.43 The Court agreed with plaintiff, stating that Congress
did not pass the NLRA with only the interest of the public in mind; it
was passed to create rights in both labor and management against one
another, and not merely as against the employer.4 Golden State
Transit found that plaintiff was entitled to seek damages against
respondent city under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the NLRA implicitly confers
certain rights for the plaintiff to bring a section 1983 suit. 45
A violation of AB 1844 does not create explicit binding
obligations on the government. According to the Legislative
Counsel's Digest, "this bill provides that the Labor Commissioner is
not required to investigate or determine any violation of a provision
of this bill." 46 However, its legislative history shows a willingness to
pass an enforcement statute; 47 it states that there is a need for this bill
to protect employees against discrimination from information
obtained through social media sites. Laws existing prior to AB 1844
did not specifically prohibit the use of information obtained through
social media sites. AB 1844 can be seen as an extension of existing
law, similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or section 7 of the
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286 (1934).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Golden State Transit Corp v. City of LA, 493 U.S. 103, 106-08 (1989).
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 109.
Id.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 980.

47. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 5.
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NLRA that protects employees from discrimination or retaliation,
and provides employees a cause of action to sue their employer.
Therefore, AB 1844 is more than an expression of legislative
preference to prevent discrimination, and thus satisfies the first prong
of the Golden State Transittest.
As for prong two of the Golden State Transit test, an employee
or applicant could cite to their interest in privacy or discrimination. 48
This interest in privacy protection, and against discrimination, is not
vague or amorphous, because these are precisely the kinds of interest
already protected under other statutes 49 but not extended to the
social media context.
As for prong three of the test, whether the provision in question
intends to benefit the plaintiff, AB 1844 is intended to benefit current
employees and applicants, and not to protect the public in general.
The Legislature Counsel Digest notes 0 specifically state that the
goals of AB 1844 are to prohibit an employer's conduct against its
employees, not prohibiting conduct against the public at large.
Therefore, a right is conferred under AB 1844 to protect the interest
of current employees and applicants regarding their social media
passwords.
B.

Is THERE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION?
The second Cort inquiry in determining whether in a statute the

legislature intended to confer a private cause of action for an
individual is to look at its legislative intent or history. The Court
stated in Thompson v. Thompson that intent might appear implicitly
in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of
its enactment.
In Thompson, a father sued under the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA") to determine the validity of
conflicting child custody decrees. Under the PKPA, states are
required to afford full faith and credit to valid child custody
determinations entered by a sister state's courts. The Court held
however that the PKPA does not provide an implied private cause of
action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state
custody decisions is valid.52 The Court looked at the context in which
the PKPA was enacted, and determined that its aim was to extend
Full Faith and Credit to custody determinations to avoid forum
shopping by plaintiffs who lost a custody battle in one state. Its intent
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See infra section IV.
42 U.S.C. § 2000; 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Assembly Bill No. 1844, Chapter 618, Sept. 27, 2012.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
Id. at 187.
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was not to create an entirely new cause of action in a new
jurisdiction.53
Thompson emphasized the importance of the legislative intent
when determining if a private cause of action can be implied from a
statute. Thus, the intent of the legislature is the ultimate issue, and
unless the intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the
statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for
implication of a private remedy does not exist. 54
The legislative intent of AB 1844, found in its committee reports,
was to further the goal of preventing discrimination or retaliation in
the employment context by limiting an employer's access to employee
information secured in social media sites. ' The legislature reasoned
that such information should also be accorded protection as
employers may use this information to engage in prohibited
discriminatory or retaliatory actions. 56
California state cases have reached similar holdings. A violation
of a state statute does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of
action.57 Instead, whether a party has a right to sue depends on
whether the legislature has manifested intent to create such a private
cause of action under the statute.5' That legislative intent, if any, is
revealed through the language of the statute and its legislative
history.59 In Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino,60 the California
Supreme Court determined whether section 351 of the Labor Code
provides a private cause of action. Section 351 provides that
gratuities received by an employee belong to the employee and not to
the employer.61
In Lu, a card dealer brought a class action against his employer,
Hawaiian Gardens Casino, based on its mandatory tip pooling policy.
The casino's policy required dealers to contribute 15 percent to 20
percent of their tips to a tip pool to be shared among other designated
employees who provided service to casino patrons. The dealer
53. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183-84.
54. Id. at 179 (internal citation omitted).
55. CAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Vikco Ins. Services Inc. v. Ohio Indem. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 55, 62 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
58. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d. 287, 305 (1988).
59. Id. at 294-95.
60. Louie Hung Kwei Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 592 (Cal. 2010).
61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 ("No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any
gratuity or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or left for an employee or patron, or deduct any
amount from wages due an employee on account of a gratuity, or require an employee to credit
the amount, or any part thereof, of a gratuity against and as part of the wages due the employee
from the employer. Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee
or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for.").
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alleged that this policy constituted a conversion of his tips and
violated section 351.62
The court stated that it required clear language in the statute to
expressly provide a private cause of action for any violation, or
language stating that an employee may bring an action to recover any
misappropriated gratuities. The court concluded that the statutory
language did not "unmistakably reveal a legislative intent to provide
wronged employees a private right to sue."6 Absent such express
language, the court then looked at the legislative history of section
351, and found that the legislature's goal was to prevent an employer
from taking any part of an employee's gratuity by crediting an
employee's tips against any wages earned, and not to provide extra
compensation to the employee. 5 Therefore, the court held that
section 351 did not provide a private right of action.
Section 351 of the Labor Code can be distinguished from AB
1844, because a violation of section 351 means the employer is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and is subject to a fine and/or imprisonment.
Thus, a mechanism exists to assure compliance. Moreover, the
Department of Industrial Relations is specifically charged with
enforcing section 351.6' AB 1844 has no such enforcement provision.
As the language stands now, it appears that a violation of AB 1844
will bring no consequences. In enacting AB 1844, the legislature was
clear that an employer should not require or request an employee or
applicant his or her social media passwords. Not providing a civil or
criminal penalty for the employer or an explicit private right of action
for the employee or applicant undercuts legislative intent since an
employer will have no incentive to comply with AB 1844. Therefore,
in order to be effective, AB 1844 should be interpreted as providing a
private cause of action for an employee or applicant.
C.

How TO DETERMINE AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY?

The last Cort inquiry is to determine what the appropriate
remedy is if a right and private right of action can be inferred from
the statute. The Court in Franklinv. Gwinnett County PublicSchools
62. Lu, 50 Cal. 4th at 595.
63. Id. at 597 (Such express language includes, "A person is liable for a cause of action for
sexual harassment when a plaintiff proves certain elements," "Nothing in this article shall limit
the right for any wage claimant to sue directly ... for any wages or penalty due him under this
article," or "Any person injured by a violation of this section may bring an action for the
recovery of damages, equitable relief, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.").
64. Id. at 598.
65. Id.at 600.
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 354.
67. Id. at § 355.
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stated that once a right and a cause of action are in place, "we
presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress
has expressly indicated otherwise." 68 Plaintiff in Franklinsued under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 providing that, "no
person shall ... on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation . . .
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program ...
receiving Federal financial assistance." 69 The plaintiff alleged that a
high school teacher subjected her to continual sexual harassment, and
that other teachers and administrators knew about this conduct and
did nothing.70 The offending teacher resigned on the condition that
the matter be dropped and the school close its investigation. 7' The
Court found nothing in the legislative history of Title IX to indicate
that Congress would not want a damage remedy for violation of Title
IX. In holding so, the Court confirmed that if a right of action exists
to enforce a right and the legislature is silent on the question of
remedies, a court might order any appropriate relief.72
Similarly, AB 1844 does not include a remedial scheme. The
statute specifically provides that the Labor Commissioner is not
required to investigate or determine any violation of this act.73 If a
statute does not require an agency or the government to act on behalf
of an aggrieved individual suing under the statute, then the individual
may sue in court and the judge may apply the gamut of remedies
traditionally available.
IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR OTHER LABOR CODE
VIOLATIONS

Remedies are an important part of any statute. If the legislature
went through the trouble of creating and passing a piece of
legislation, it only . makes sense that it envisioned some sort of
consequence for a violation of it, otherwise, a right without a remedy
truly is a "monstrous absurdity." 74

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992).
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2012).
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 69.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2013).
Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1938); see also Zeigler, supra note 6, at 68 (2001).
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REMEDIES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACT OF

2004
To improve the enforcement of the labor laws, in 2004 the
California Legislature enacted Labor Code sections 2698 et. seq.,
known as The Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"). Under
PAGA, aggrieved employees can step into the shoes of the
enforcement agency," acting as private Attorney General, and file a
lawsuit in the public interest to recover civil penalties for certain
Labor Code violations. PAGA grew out of the inability of the Labor
Commission's enforcement budget to keep pace with growth in the
economy, thus authorizing employees to maintain private and class
actions for certain Labor Code violations.
Sections 2698 and 2699 assign new civil penalties to the many
substantive Labor Code provisions that previously did not carry
penalties. PAGA includes a list of numerous Labor Code sections
that may not contain a remedial scheme, and provides a catchall
remedial scheme for these violations. Collecting civil penalties under
the PAGA benefits both the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency ("LWDA") and employees, because 75 percent
of the recovered penalties go to the state and 25 percent to the
employee who brought the PAGA claim.
Labor Code section 1194 exemplifies how PAGA changed the
way workers may adjudicate their rights regarding the payment of
minimum wage. Existing law provided that employers that fail to pay
minimum wage are subject to penalties of $50 per pay period for each
affected employee for the first violation, and $250 for succeeding
violations. Previously, the LWDA was responsible for assessing and
collecting these types of penalties, and the labor commissioner was
the only entity that could bring actions for civil penalties. Under
PAGA, a plaintiff may now pursue a case against the employer and
obtain recovery.
PAGA has four major provisions.7 ' First, for substantive Labor
Code sections that at the time of their enactment carried no civil
penalties, PAGA creates a formula for assessing penalties: If a person
or company does not employ any "workers," 77 then the civil penalty is
$500 per violation. If the person or company employs one or more
employees, then the civil penalty is $100 per employee per pay period
75. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (explaining that a violation of a wage and hour statute can be
brought before the DLSE).
76. Id. at §§ 2698 et. seq.
77. Some employers may employ workers on a contingent basis (i.e., part time) and are not
treated as "workers" under certain employee protection status such as the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
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for the initial violation, and $200 per employee per pay period for the
second or subsequent violations." Second, an aggrieved employee
may recover the civil penalty only through a civil action filed on
behalf of him or herself, or other current or former employees. Any
employee who prevails is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney
fees and costs. Third, an aggrieved employee may not maintain a
private right of action to recover civil penalties if the Labor
Department cites the employer for a Labor Code violation and
initiates proceedings to collect the applicable penalties.o Finally, the
court will distribute civil penalties recovered by aggrieved workers as
follows: 50 percent to the state general fund, 25 percent to the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency and 25 percent to the aggrieved
workers.s"
PAGA is not popular with employers, because employees only
have to prove a violation, and do not have to show that they suffered
actual harm from the employer's violation. As a result, some
practitioners argue that the statute encourages employees to sue over
insignificant technical violations that could amount to millions of
dollars in penalties for a single employer.8 2
Most of the code provisions protected under PAGA are related
to wage and hour, whistle blowers, work place injuries and illnesses;
PAGA also prohibits retaliation or discrimination against employees
who report unsafe conditions and other Labor Code violations that
require an employer to cure the violation. The last category of
"other" Labor Code violations where PAGA provides penalties
includes section 432.2 where a private employer cannot require a
polygraph test for an employee or applicant, and section 432.7 where
an employer cannot ask about arrests that did not result in
convictions. AB 1844 is similar to these Code sections, because it
prohibits an employer from seeking something from an applicant or
employee due to the privacy interest of the applicant or employee.
78. Michael D. Singer, New Law Allows Employccs to Sue for Labor Code Violations,
DAILY JOURNAL (Oct. 28,2003), availablc athttp://ckslaw.com/pdflNewLaw.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Leonora M. Schloss & Cari A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor Code Private
Attorneys GeneralAct, L.A. LAWYER, (Feb. 2006), at 13. (For example, the chemical company
Amgen, which employs 6000 workers, was sued for $170 million for primarily technical
violations. Specifically, the suit alleged Amgen violated a requirement that employers file with
the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") a copy of their employment
applications if employees are compelled to sign them. Amgen also allegedly violated the law by
posting a statement of rights for whistle blowers that was printed using a type size that was
smaller than 16-point type. The fact that the company posted the statement was insufficient for
the employees who sued over the small size of the font.). Umbrasas v. Amgen, Inc., No. SCO
38844, 2006 WL 1173421 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App May 4, 2006).
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The California Court of Appeal in Starbucks Corporationv. Superior
Court affirmed that individuals might sue, and recover actual
damages or statutory penalties for section 432.7 violations due to the
privacy interest of the employee. Under sections 432.2 and 432.7,
the employee or applicant may bring an action to recover actual
damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, and actual attorney's fees.84
Like section 432.7 or 432.2, where an employee's privacy interest is
protected, AB 1844 should also be included in PAGA's remedial
scheme allowing an applicant or employee to file suit against an
employer for violation of AB 1844, and be provided with a remedial
scheme that AB 1844 lacks due to the similar privacy interest at stake.
B.

BASING A CAUSE OF ACTION AS A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY

Another potential way for an applicant or employee to bring suit
under AB 1844 is to state a cause of action for wrongful termination
in violation of fundamental public policy." The California Court of
Appeal in Davis v. ConsolidatedFreightwaysheld that Labor Code
section 432.2 could be a source of "fundamental," "substantial" or
"well-established" public policy.86
Section 432.2 prohibits an
employer from requiring any employee to take a polygraph test as a
condition of employment or continued employment. Plaintiff in
Davis alleged that written notice is required before a poly raph test is
administered, and that no such notice was given to him. While the
court ultimately dismissed the case on other grounds, the court did
acknowledge, albeit implicitly, that section 432.2 may be used to
allege a cause of action of wrongful termination in violation of public
policy." The remedies available in this private cause of action are
those generally available under tort law. Because of the similarities in
the privacy interest that section 432.2 and AB 1844 aim to protect,
and the public interest found in both statutes, a wrongful termination

83. Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 4th 820, 828 (2011).
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2; 432.7.
85. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d. 654, 666-67 (1988). Note that wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy would only apply for already employed workers who were
subsequently discharged for failure to provide their social media passwords, and does not apply
to applicants or prospective employees.
86. Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 29 Cal. App. 4th 354, 369-70 (1994).
87. Id. at 370.
88. Id. (explaining that "To the extent plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy rests on Labor Code section 432.2 ... plaintiff failed to raise a triable
issue of fact on that [because plaintiff declined to take the polygraph test and none was ever
administered]).
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in violation of public policy cause of action should also be available
for AB 1844.
C.

PROVIDE A CIVIL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF

AB 1844

A civil penalty is a monetary fine that is designed to compensate
for harm. It is not designed to punish the person for whom the
penalty is imposed; instead it is designed to make the party who was
damaged or injured whole. Prior to the enactment of PAGA, civil
penalties could only be assessed by state agencies." However, some
Labor Code provisions provided that plaintiffs could recover
statutory penalties through private actions. For example, Labor Code
Section 203 states that a terminated employee whose wages are not
paid at the time of discharge may recover a statutory penalty equal to
the employee's daily wages for each day, up to 30 days, that the
payment is delayed. In addition, Section 256 authorizes the Labor
Commissioner to assess civil penalties for the same violation.
The California Court of Appeal in Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v.
Superior Court0 discussed the civil penalties PAGA added to certain
Labor Code sections allowing an individual plaintiff instead of a state
agency to sue for civil penalties. PAGA establishes a default penalty
and a private right of action for an aggrieved employee to bring a civil
action to enforce those provisions, subject to the procedures in
section 2699.3.9' As the court in CaliberBodyworks discussed, the
same procedural requirements also could be required before an
employee is allowed to sue for civil penalties. The procedural history
of PAGA demonstrates that the procedural requirement, later added
as an amendment to PAGA, was a compromise between employers
and employees by allowing the LWDA to act first on more "serious
violations" such as wage and hour violations, and give employers an
opportunity to cure less serious violations.92 Therefore, it is possible
for the judiciary to issue a civil penalty similar to that found in PAGA
to an employer in violation of AB 1844.
PAGA has not been amended to include any non-listed statutes;
therefore, the best course of action is for a court to simply follow the
procedures in issuing a remedy found in PAGA when dealing with
similar, non-listed statutes added to the Labor Code subsequent to
PAGA's passage.
89. Schloss & Cohorn, supra note 83, at 16.
90. Caliber Bodyworks, Inc., v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 365 (2005).
91. Id. at 375.
92. Id.

93. There have been no published cases that allow PAGA to be judicially extended or limit
PAGA's reach to its listed statutes.
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DONALD ZEIGLER'S SOLUTION- CONSOLIDATE THE RIGHTS,
RIGHT OF ACTION, AND REMEDIES TRIFOCAL APPROACH INTO
A SINGLE APPROACH

Professor Donald Zeigler of New York Law School published an
article in 200194 advocating for a single inquiry of rights, rights of
actions and remedies, because he believed they are interrelated
conceptually and practically.95 A right without a remedy is not a legal
right; it is merely a hope or a wish. For example, a decision about a
cause of action directly affects both rights and remedies. A cause of
action connects a right and a remedy, and if one has no cause of
action, one has no right and no remedy.97
Professor Zeigler then laid out the problems caused by the
Court's traditional separation of the rights, right of action and
remedies equation. "By focusing on only one part of the equation,
the Court does not acknowledge the impact of its decisions on the
other parts."98 By separating the inquiry, sometimes the Court
disguises what it is doing. 99 For example, in Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Association,"" a Virginia health care provider brought a
section 1983"o' suit against state officials claiming that Virginia's
reimbursement plan violated a provision of the federal Medicaid Act
requiring payment rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities. The Court in Wilder followed the test articulated in Golden
State,1 0 namely, whether the legislature intended the provision to
benefit someone like the plaintiff, whether it is mandatory, (as
opposed to merely a congressional preference), and whether it is too
vague and amorphous for judicial enforcement. The Court further
found that the test is quite similar to that used in Cort v. Ash. 103
Whether plaintiffs are the intended beneficiaries of the statute is
similar to the first Cort inquiry. In Wilder, health care providers were
the intended beneficiaries of the provision requiring reasonable and
adequate reimbursement rates. Whether the provision is mandatory
or merely reflects a congressional preference overlaps the second
Cort inquiry: Is there any indication of legislative intent either to
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Zeigler, supra note 6, at 69.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 112.
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502-04 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Golden State, 493 U.S. 103.
Cort, 422 U.S. 66.
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create a private remedy or to deny one?1M Finally, whether a private
remedy was foreclosed by the existence of a comprehensive
enforcement scheme overlaps the third Cort question: Is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff?'
Wilder noted that the Medicaid Act
contains few enforcement provisions; the Secretary of Health and
Human Services can withhold approval of state plans or withhold
federal funds from states whose plans do not comply with the Act.'"
Although Wilder did not address it, the existence of a private remedy
is probably necessary to effectuate the underlying congressional
purpose to require states to reimburse health care providers at
reasonable and adequate rates. Thus, although the Court purported
to address only whether the statute confers a right and whether the
private remedy the plaintiff sought was foreclosed by the existence of
a comprehensive remedial scheme, its discussion parallels the Cort v.
Ash analysis.'"
Zeigler believes that this separate inquiry leads the Court to
misstate what it is doing.'" For example, in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent SchoolDistrict'" and Davis v. Monroe County Board of

Education,"o two Title IX sexual harassment decisions, the Court
purports to delimit the remedy that a student can obtain from a
school district, but in fact also circumscribes students' rights and
rights of action under Title IX."' Students do not have a general
right to be free of sexual harassment at school, because the Court
imposes several conditions on recovery. Gebser holds that a student
may not recover damages from a school district for sexual harassment
by a teacher unless a school district official with authority to
intervene has actual notice of the teacher's misconduct and does
Davis also imposes an "actual notice-deliberate
nothing.112
indifference" condition on recovery for harassment."' If students
have no right, and no remedy, then Title IX's implied right of action
is of no use.114 Because the decisions in Gebser and Davis so plainly
affect students' rights, and rights of action, it is very misleading for

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Con, 422 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 80.
Wilder,496 U.S. at 522.
Zeigler, supra note 6, at 114.
Id.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (2012).
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91.
Davis, 422 U.S. at 633, 650.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278-79.
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the Court to contend that it is only addressing the scope of the
damage remedy.
The separate criteria developed by the Court for assessing each
element are not sufficient to answer the overarching question of
whether the statutory provision on which a plaintiff relies creates the
rights and duties claimed, and entitles the plaintiff to the particular
remedy sought. Instead, Zeigler advocates for a different approach.
In place of the three-part test, a single, integrated test should be used.
This new test is more of an analytic process than a set of fixed criteria.
The test has a process whereby the court will look at the language of
the statute, and the overall statutory context. Courts routinely begin
with the statutory language when interpreting a statute."
The
Court's inquiry here will focus on several questions: What does the
provision say, and is there a clear and logical fit between the
language, and the defendant's conduct?
Does it expressly or
specifically prohibit the defendant from doing what he has done or
require him to do something he has failed to do?"'6 In addition, does
the provision appear to have been enacted to protect someone like
the plaintiff? Does the language of the statute confer rights directly
on the class of persons that includes the plaintiff, or does it only
create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at
large? This may sound similar to the first Cort criteria ("Is the
plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted?"), but Cort is too restrictive, because the use of the word
"especial" suggests that a statute cannot confer enforceable rights on
several groups of people in the same statutory provision."
The
legislature can confer rights of primary and secondary importance in
one provision, and still intend that they all be enforced. Thus, even if
plaintiff is part of the class for whose secondary benefit the statute
was enacted, it will disqualify him from enforcing the provision under
Cort. With Zeigler's approach, this plaintiff may still benefit from the
statute. Admittedly, Zeigler himself recognizes that drawing the line
of which class or classes the legislature intended to benefit whether it
is the primary, secondary or tertiary) could be problematic.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Russell'
illustrates the difficulty in drawing such lines. In Russell, plaintiff was
a beneficiary under two employee benefit plans administered by
Massachusetts Mutual. She alleged that the fiduciaries administering
115. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp., v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991).
116. Zeigler, supranote 6, at 127.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 128. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); (stating that
the court should look to the overall statutory context and not just the plain language).
119. Mass. MutualLile Ins. Co., 473 U.S. 134.
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the plans improperly cut off her benefits for a back ailment, and
violated federal regulations by taking 132 days to process her claim. 120
Although her benefits were restored, she sued for financial losses
suffered because her disabled husband was forced to cash out his
retirement plan to tide them over.121 The court of appeals held that
section 409(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") entitled plaintiff to relief. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, read section 409(a) differently. The Court pointed out that
section 409(a) only requires a fiduciary that breaches its duty to make
good any losses to the plan resulting from such breach. 122 It does not
make the fiduciary liable to individual beneficiaries. 123 However,
section 409(a) is intended to benefit plan beneficiaries. The purpose
of section 409(a) is to ensure the plan remains financially sound, and
its assets are not stolen so that money is available to the plan's
beneficiaries. Thus, in writing section 409(a), Congress intended to
benefit the group of which plaintiff was a member, even if only in a
derivative or secondary way. Arguably then, the plaintiff in Russell
should have been allowed to sue under section 409(a).
The second aspect of Zeigler's approach looks at the overall
statutory context. If it is unclear whether the language of the
provision that a plaintiff relies on entitles the plaintiff to the
particular remedy sought, a court should broaden the inquiry beyond
that provision.124 A court should look at the overall structure and
purpose of the statute for guidance. Several questions are pertinent:
Why did the legislature enact this statute? What was it trying to
accomplish? What problem was the legislature responding to, and
how did it seek to cure or correct it? By answering these questions, a
court can provide a context for interpreting the provision. It can
determine whether the remedy sought would be consistent with the
underlying purposes of the statute. The Supreme Court often
considers statutory structure and purpose in deciding whether a
statutory provision confers a right.12 The Court also routinely relies
on overall statutory context in deciding whether a statute should be
read to authorize the remedy the plaintiff seeks.126 Reliance on these
background understandings is a necessary and legitimate device for
construing unclear or ambiguous statutory provisions.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
(1993).
126.

Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 133.
See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86; Gebser, supra note 109.
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Applying Zeigler's approach to AB 1844, one should look to the
language of AB 1844 and if the language is unclear whether or not
plaintiff is entitled to the remedy, then one should look to the overall
statutory context. Here, AB 1844 says, "an employer shall not
discharge, discipline ... or otherwise retaliate against an employee or
applicant for not complying with a request or demand by the
employer that violates this section."1 2 7 However, the language goes
on to say, "[AB 1844] does not prohibit an employer from
terminating or otherwise taking an adverse action against an
employee or applicant if otherwise permitted by law." 28 It is unclear
what remedy, if any, the language of AB 1844 suggests. Since the
language is unclear, we then turn to the overall statutory context.
The language does specifically prohibit an employer from requiring
or requesting an employee or applicant for employment to "disclose a
username or password for the purpose of accessing personal social
media."12 9 The statute was enacted with employees and applicants in
mind as the statute was intended to protect their privacy interests. 130
The statute was not intended to benefit the public at large; it was
intended to benefit the employees and applicants. 13 1 Therefore, the
statutory context does suggest that the legislature intended to confer
a right, right of action and give plaintiff a remedy under AB 1844.132
V. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR AB 1844
AB 1844 is not listed as a statute specifically to provide a private
cause of action under PAGA because PAGA was enacted in 2004
while AB 1844 became effective in 2013. Had AB 1844 been enacted
first, it is conceivable that AB 1844's provisions would be included in
the statute as well. Also, the courts could adopt the civil 3penalty
scheme found in PAGA for violations arising from AB 1844" either
in lieu of a private right of action or in addition to it. Another
solution proposed above is to create a public policy exception with
AB 1844 whereby plaintiffs could sue their employers for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy if employers were to demand
plaintiffs for their social media passwords. This scheme is probably

127. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. SeC generallyCAL. S. RULES COMM., 3D READING, AB 1844.
131. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980.

132. Zeigler argues that once a statute is intended to give plaintiff a remedy, he presumes the
availability of all appropriate remedies, unless the legislature has expressly indicated otherwise.
Zeigler, supra note 6, at 99.
133. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698 et seq.
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not the best solution, because suing for a wrongful discharge would
not apply to prospective employees (whom obviously had not been
discharged), whom the legislature also intended to protect.
Prospective employees would not suffer an adverse employment
action unlike employees; therefore, this cause of action may not
protect them. After finding that AB 1844 does create a right, and
right of action following the Zeigler approach, a court is free to
choose a remedial scheme discussed above that best fits the facts in
the particular case before them.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it stands, AB 1844 prohibits employers from engaging in
certain activity, but the statute lacks any recourse or consequences
when an employer does engage in the prohibited activity. However,
because AB 1844 protects privacy interests in the work place,
employees should be allowed to sue for violations of AB 1844. When
confronted with plaintiffs suing under AB 1844, California courts
should interpret the statute as creating a right, and right of action for
the plaintiffs, and follow the remedial scheme from PAGA as if AB
1844 is listed, because of the similarities of the statutes in PAGA to
AB 1844.

